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Abstract
Selective impairment in recognition of faces (prosopagnosia) has been advanced as an argument for a brain module dedicated
to face processing and focusing on the speci®c con®gural properties of faces. Loss of the inversion eect supposedly
strengthened the argument ([10]: de Gelder B, Bachoud-Levi AC, Degos JD. Inversion superiority in visual agnosia may be
common to a variety of orientation polarised objects besides faces. Vision Research, 1998;38:2855±61; [20]: Farah MJ, Wilson
K, Drain H, Tanaka J. The inverted face inversion eect in prosopagnosia: Evidence for mandatory, face-speci®c perceptual
mechanisms. Vision Research 1995b;35:2089±93). The present study of prosopagnosic patient LH reports that he has lost the
normal pattern of superior performance with upright faces and objects and shows instead paradoxical inversion eect for faces
but also for objects. Experiment 2 investigated whether LH's use of features based route for processing upright objects would be
hindered by the whole-based encoding when processing upright objects. The data show the same context eect for objects as was
found for faces. Therefore the inversion eect does not present decisive evidence for the existence of a face module. Moreover,
the importance of con®guration-based recognition known to be crucial for face processing, must also be taken seriously for
object recognition. 7 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Two contrasting views of the relation between dis-
orders of visual object recognition (visual object agno-
sia) and face recognition (either in the narrow or the
wide sense of prosopagnosia) are currently pursued
with a variety of research methods. The search for
neuroanatomical substrates special to faces was the
topic of animal studies using single cell recording in
the temporal cortex ([35], but see [24]) and continues
with recent fMRI and ERP studies (e.g. [25±27]). At
the core of the debates in neuropsychology is the ques-
tion whether prosopagnosia re¯ects the existence of an
autonomous processing system possibly based on a
hard-wired face module (e.g. [19,20]). Support for the
view that faces are unique perceptual stimuli has been
provided by studies of patients with brain damage that
have established material speci®c dissociations (for
recent studies see Refs. [17,19,23,31]). In the literature
on normal face processing arguments in favor of a
specialized face processor are related to special eects
obtained in studies of face processing. These include
the inversion eect and the face context eect, both
explained by reference to the stimulus con®guration in
the sense of the relation between the parts of a stimu-
lus [1,8,13,37] and special processing strategies like hol-
istic encoding [21]. An alternative view challenges the
idea of a radical dissociation between a processing
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route for faces and a separate one for other visual
objects. Prosopagnosia thus appears as an extreme
manifestation of damage to the object recognition sys-
tem. For example, prosopagnosia has been interpreted
as a problem in discriminating highly resembling items
[6,7,33], as when within = category discrimination is
required (see also [28]). A similar prediction is that
speci®c patterns of performance (like the inversion
eect or the context eect) found in studies of face rec-
ognition also obtain in object perception given the
right control stimuli and task demands [10].
The best known example of a characteristic pattern
of performance linked to the nature of the visual
stimulus is the inversion eect (the relative loss of per-
formance with inverted as contrasted to upright faces).
Yin [40] showed that upside-down presentation
aected recognition performance for faces but much
less so for other mono-oriented stimuli such as houses.
In a follow up study Yin [41] asked whether brain
damage in areas thought to be critical for face recog-
nition would have a negative impact on the preferen-
tial treatment of upright faces. He observed that right
posterior brain damage eliminated the normal inver-
sion eect. This ®nding fueled the idea that the inver-
sion eect presents a benchmark of normal face
processing and subsequently the inversion eect is
absent after the loss of face recognition abilities in
adulthood.
Pursuing Yin's idea Farah and collaborators [20]
studied the inversion eect in a prosopagnosic patient
LH expecting that this eect would have disappeared.
They reached a very dierent conclusion since the
patient was actually better at matching upside-down
faces. In an eort to explain this puzzling result the
authors argued that it is due to a continuing interfer-
ence from an impaired but still active face processor,
and therefore constitutes conclusive evidence (an `exist-
ence proof') for a face module. There are two major
problems with this conclusion. The ®rst problem for
such a strong modularist conclusion concerns the re-
lation between face and object processing, and the
absence of an appropriate control task for fully intact
object processing. The second is that this conclusion is
too broad and leaves entirely open what the pattern of
spared and intact aspects of the face processor might
be.
As a matter of fact, the study by Farah et al.
reached somewhat strong conclusions given that it
did not use objects as a control stimuli with an exem-
plar level recognition task [6,7]. It is well known that
the inversion eect, though normally strongest with
faces, has also been found with objects. Inversion
eects have been reported for visual materials like
handwriting [3] and gundogs, but not landscapes or
houses [13]. A recent study by Donnelly and Davido
[14] used houses and scrambled houses and found
clear evidence for the importance of con®guration in
object recognition. The relevance of the appropriate
comparison was brought home by a recent study
reporting that patient AD suering from visual object
agnosia and prosopagnosia showed an inversion
superiority eect not only for faces but also for
objects [10]. The object category selected for the com-
parison with faces in this study were shoes. Like
faces, shoes have a similar shape and are found in
many exemplars. Shoes were also chosen because they
had two characteristics that allowed to maximize
similarity between the object and face task. Like
faces, shoes have a canonical orientation, a relevant
property for studying the face inversion eect. More-
over, often in daily life visual search is aimed at rec-
ognition at the exemplar level, as is the case in face
recognition.
In this study our goal was to investigate patient
LH who unlike patient AD was known to be agnosic
only for faces [30]. Therefore we expected to ®nd a
clear dissociation between his performance for face
and object stimuli equated otherwise for task and
level of recognition. It is worth noting though that a
recent study of LH mentions without further detail
that this patient does have some problems in the
domain of object and animal recognition [16]. But
since this patient is considered in the literature as a
particularly good case of prosopagnosia [16,19,20]
our prediction was that LH would show the paradox-
ical pattern of better performance with upsidedown
stimuli only for faces and not for objects. Such an
outcome would be in line with the strong assump-
tions about face modularity encountered in the study
by Farah et al. But if there is a similar impairment
for faces and objects the radical explanations of face
modularity would not be supported. In contrast, such
an outcome would be consistent with theories that
envisage a stage or a separable dimension of visual
processing related to the overall orientation and con-
®guration of both object and face stimuli. It might
even be hypothesized that in¯uence of con®guration
needs to be studied in the light of external factors
such as memory involvement, expertise, and similar
exemplar recognition rather than stimulus class
[13,22,32].
The second problem with the idea of inhibition
from an impaired face processor is that the notion of
a face processor seems too general and opaque to be
helpful in sorting out which aspects of face processing
are lost and which ones are still intact and thus for
understanding which intact aspects if any inhibit
which others. For example, an explanation for inver-
sion superiority envisaged by Farah and collaborators
is holistic processing or the notion that in face pro-
cessing the face as a whole is stored and that individ-
ual parts are not coded separately [21]. The ®nding
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that the patient is unable to match upright faces and
base his judgement on local similarities between face
parts could be advanced in support of the claim that
faces are encoded holistically and that face parts are
not represented in any detail. A dierent explanation
is that when presented with a face intact con®gural
processing is still triggered and overrules or inhibits
the patients' intact general (i.e. non face speci®c) pro-
cessing routes making it impossible for him to deal
with stimulus parts [34].
This brings us to the second issue. Studies of the
inversion eect do not allow to select the best of
those two explanations of the face inversion eect
because they only provide insight into the role of
face con®guration in connection with canonical orien-
tation and do not inform directly about the impact
of con®guration on the ability to process parts of the
face in isolation. This issue was the focus of a recent
study where the goal was to assess whether structural
encoding of the face was still intact in LH [11].
Those experiments centered on the face context eect
and tasks were selected because they encourage pro-
cessing of the separate face parts. The results showed
that unlike normal viewers LH cannot attend to the
face parts even when the task explicitly requires it
and that faces need to be presented to him upside-
down or at least scrambled before he manages to
match parts. In this study we investigate whether
similar context eects as those found with faces can
be replicated and extended to objects. Since context
eects have also repeatedly been reported for objects
the second question in the present study is whether
the abnormal context eect for faces will also be
observed in a parts matching task for objects. Exper-
iment 2 focuses on that question.
2. Case presentation
Patient LH is a 46 year-old man who has been pro-
sopagnosic since an automobile accident 25 years ear-
lier. Brain damage from the accident and subsequent
surgery consisted of bilateral occipito-temporal and
right frontal and anterior temporal lesions. For ad-
ditional neuropsychological information, see
[16,19,20,30]. Copying, drawing, reading and writing
are normal. From these reports it appears that his rec-
ognition of real objects and pictures is only mildly
impaired. The authors mention that some informal
testing also included discrimination of common ani-
mals which is said to be impaired but no data are pro-
vided [16]. Testing of object recognition requiring only
category assignment ([19], Experiment 1) and within
category discrimination using eyeglass frames ([19], Ex-
periment 2) was normal. He is profoundly prosopag-
nosic and unable to recognize friends, neighbors or
even his wife and children in the absence of other cues
to identity besides the face.
3. Experiment 1. The inversion eect for faces and
objects
The goal of this experiment was to investigate
whether the superior performance with upside down
stimulus presentation which was previously reported in
patient LH for faces would also obtain when the
patient was presented with a similarly designed object
matching task.
3.1. Materials and tasks
The material consisted of photographs of human
faces and of shoes. These materials were previously
used in a study of normal subjects tested with standard
computer presentation and short exposure times in
order to provide a normal baseline concerning the
eects of inversion on recognition of these two ma-
terials (see Ref. [10], Experiment 1). The faces were
those of eight young male adults, each photographed
once in frontal view and once in 3/4 orientation. For
shoes, eight exemplars were similarly photographed
once in upper front view, i.e. with the tip of the shoes
pointing toward the camera, and once in 3/4 orien-
tation. The photographs were taken with a Canon Still
Video Camera RC-560 and stored on video disc VF-
50. They were presented manually as 7  7 cm black
and white laser prints.
The experiment used a 2AFC task. Three pictures
of the same type (faces or shoes, upright or inverted),
one target and two probes, were presented simul-
taneously (Experiment 1a) or sequentially (Experiment
1b). The target picture was always a front view one,
and the positive probe was the 3/4 pro®le view of the
same person/shoes, while the negative probe rep-
resented a dierent person/pair of shoes. Twenty
combinations with shoes and 16 with the face stimuli
were created. The target picture was presented above
the two probe pictures shown side by side below. The
patient was instructed to indicate the positive probe
by verbal response. In Experiment 1a the stimuli
Table 1
Number (percentage) correct responses on faces and shoes in simul-
taneous presentation
Upright Inverted
Faces 36/80 (45%) 65/80 (81%)
Shoes 31/64 (48%) 51/64 (80%)
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were shown in free vision. In Experiment 1b the pic-
tures were shown for 3 s. followed after a 2 s interval
by the probe pictures. Testing was always run in sep-
arate and equivalent blocks of trials, with the same
number `same' and `dierent' trials for the dierent
type of material. Blocks alternated between faces and
shoe stimuli, and between upright and inverted pres-
entation. The experiment was preceded by eight prac-
tice trials (two of each stimulus type).
3.2. Results
LH's identi®cation performance was signi®cantly
better with inverted stimuli than with upright ones for
faces as well as for shoes (see Tables 1 and 2). That
pattern obtained with simultaneous matching (faces:
w21, 160  22:6, p < 0:001; shoes: w21, 128  13:6,
p < 0:001), as well as with delayed matching (faces:
w21, 160  31:3, p < 0:001; shoes: w21, 128  9:9
p < 0:002). It will be noted that for both materials,
identi®cation of upright items was at chance level. The
pattern shown by LH is thus very dierent from the
normal one. The performance of normal subjects
tested previously showed a clear advantage for upright
presentations of faces but not of objects when the
stimulus pairs were presented simultaneously but with
limited (500 ms) presentation time [10]. However, in
another study [12] where we used simultaneous match-
ing (with the same paradigm and stimuli as presented
here), normal subjects showed a face inversion eect
(869 ms and 95% correct for upright vs 973 ms and
94% correct for inverted presentation). Moreover, in
this same study normals also showed an inversion
eect with the shoes when these were presented for
2500 ms and 2500 ms delay (729 ms and 94% upright
vs 773 ms and 94% for inverted).
3.3. Discussion
We presented LH with a matching task that was
designed to allow a close comparison between the
existence of an inversion eect for faces and for
objects. Our result shows that prosopagnosic patient
LH had a similar pattern of performance in the two
cases, performing at chance with canonical upright
oriented stimuli but displaying a very good perform-
ance when the stimuli were presented upside down.
The ®nding by Farah and collaborators of better per-
formance on inverted faces in prosopagnosic patient
LH is now replicated with new materials. LHs per-
formance with upright faces is poorer than was
observed by Farah et al. [20], probably because the
present task required matching across a change in
viewpoint which makes the present paradoxical inver-
sion eect even stronger.
The new ®nding is that LHs paradoxical inversion
eect for faces previously observed by Farah et al.
[20] extends also to objects. Poor performance with
upright objects compared with previous results may
be due to task demands as well as to peripheral fac-
tors like stimulus diculty but we do not believe the
latter can explain the result. Our stimuli were more
dicult than those used previously to examine LHs
visual object abilities. Stimulus diculty may exacer-
bate a mild visual object agnosia that goes unnoticed
with stimuli that are less taxing or that are less simi-
lar to faces like eyeglass frames [19]. Also, our task
was more dicult because it was designed to target
speci®cally object identity recognition at the exemplar
level, a task that had not been administered to LH
previously but which is the critical one for a compari-
son between performance of face and object recog-
nition. Neither of these factors can however explain
the dramatic dierence between performance with
upright and inverted stimulus presentation. Unlike
the within category discrimination task using eye-
glasses, our task did not just require detection of
physical similarity, but matching across a dierence
in viewpoint [19]. When this task was presented to
normal subjects it did yield an inversion eect for
objects which was less strong but similar to that
obtained with faces [12]. For the present results with
LH, the size of the inversion eect is not important
as both objects and faces showed the unexpected
eect of improved performance after inversion. In
conclusion, the fact that LH can reliably match
inverted but not upright stimuli suggests that a parts-
based processing route is intact but that there is
interference on its application to upright stimuli from
a processing route that targets the whole stimulus
and focuses on the con®guration. Experiment 2 was
run in order to obtain evidence for the impact of
object con®guration on such parts-based processes.
4. Experiment 2. The role of context in parts-based
matching of objects
In a previous study [11] we reported that LH's per-
formance was strongly under the impact of the overall
con®guration even when explicitly instructed to judge
Table 2
Number (percentage) correct responses on faces and shoes in delayed
presentation
Upright Inverted
Faces 34/80 (43%) 68/80 (85%)
Shoes 33/64 (52%) 50/64 (78%)
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whether a separately presented face part was the same
as the corresponding face part presented inside a face.
Here we report the experiment where the critical con-
text for the parts matching task was a house. The
house stimuli consisted of complete houses and of
house parts and the stimuli as well as the task require-
ments were designed to be very similar to the face
stimuli used in the face context task.
4.1. Materials and procedure
Stimuli were grey scale front view pictures of houses
which had been computer edited. One prototypical
stimulus was selected to be used as the outer contour
in which dierent house parts (front door, two win-
dows) taken from the other pictures were inserted.
With these materials a total of eight dierent house
and house part stimuli were created (eight front doors
and eight upper windows). Each full house stimulus
was paired with two part probes (its own and a dier-
ent one), both for the door and for the window, mak-
ing a total of 16 trials. This procedure for stimulus
construction was identical to the one used for con-
struction of the face stimulus presented to LH in a
study reported elsewhere [11]. Stimuli were presented
once upright and once upside down. Trials were
blocked by orientation. Each condition was presented
twice resulting in a total of 64 trials. Half of the trials
of each block was presented followed by half of the
trials of the other block so that condition order was
balanced. The Experiment was ®rst run using simul-
taneous presentation of the whole houses and the part
probes (Experiment 2a). The patient was instructed to
respond as accurately and as fast as possible but was
given unlimited viewing time. Some months later the
experiment was repeated with delayed presentation
(Experiment 2b). The complete stimuli were shown
®rst for 2500 ms followed by a 2500 ms interval after
which the two probes were shown for as long as the
patient needed to give his response.
4.2. Results and discussion
The results of the simultaneous matching task show
that LH is sensitive to the canonical orientation of the
stimulus since matching of the stimulus part is easier
when the stimulus is presented upside down than when
it is upright w21, 128  17:8, p < 0:001 Likewise,
the data of the delayed matching indicate that it is
much easier for LH to match a house part to the full
stimulus kept in memory with an upside down rather
that a normally oriented house w21, 128  31:0, p <
0:001: In other words, the performance of patient LH
in both tasks shows a context inferiority eect (see
Table 3).
It is instructive to compare these results with data
obtained with a group of normal controls. Normal
viewers were not sensitive to orientation neither in the
simultaneous (1138 ms and 98% correct for upright vs
1163 ms and 98% for inverted) nor in the delayed
(1081 ms and 84% correct for upright vs 1070 ms and
84% correct for inverted) matching task ([12], exp. 4).
The dierence between the pattern of normals and
that of patient LH suggests again an exacerbated sensi-
tivity to the whole stimulus context in the canonical
orientation just as was found in Experiment 1. More-
over, unlike normal subjects LH can not overcome the
impact of the whole con®guration. We return to this
issue below.
We can also compare LH's results with data from
another patient RP suering from prosopagnosia as a
consequence of a very similar brain trauma [12].
Patient RP also performed better with upside down
than with normally oriented houses albeit only in the
delayed presentation condition. Finally and most
importantly, we can compare LHs results on the pre-
sent object task with previously obtained results on a
very similar parts matching task using faces [11]. The
superior performance with objects presented upside
down mirrors the results obtained when LH was pre-
sented with a parts-based matching task using faces.
Taken together these data thus indicate that a whole
stimulus context is detrimental for the prosopagnosic
patients' matching performances for objects just as
was the case for face stimuli.
5. General discussion
The goal of this study was to investigate to what
extend the deviant patterns of performance observed
previously in a face inversion and a face context task
would now also be found in very similar object match-
ing tasks. The results of Experiment 1 show that loss
of the inversion eect and its replacement by superior
performance with upside down presented stimuli was
replicated for faces and was now also found for
objects. In the same vein, Experiment 2 shows that the
presence of a full stimulus interferes with recognition
of one of its parts and that this context inferiority
eect obtains as well for houses. Thus, these data
Table 3
Number (percentage) correct responses on houses in simultaneous
and delayed presentation
Upright Inverted
Simultaneous 44/64 (69%) 62/64 (97%)
Delayed 30/64 (47%) 59/64 (92%)
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replicate the previous reported `inverted face inversion
eect' and signi®cantly extend the ®ndings by revealing
mandatory con®gural processing with objects.
The ®rst thing to note is that the result obtained
with faces in Experiment 1 replicated the report of LH
[20], of AD [10] and of RP [12]. The fact that at least
in some acquired prosopagnosia patients the de®cit
manifests itself in such a dramatic reversal of the nor-
mal pattern underscores the importance of the normal
face con®guration and thus of the face inversion task
as a benchmark for intact face recognition in patients
in whom face expertise was present before their brain
injury. Interestingly, our study of a developmental pro-
sopagnosic patient revealed that his recognition per-
formance was insensitive to face orientation (Patient
AV, [12]). In this context it is also worth noting that
brain damage can lead to contrasts between canonical
and non-canonical stimulus presentation that are quite
a bit stronger than those observed in normal viewers
or than what is revealed by brain imaging studies of
normal viewers. For example, Jereys [26] recorded
ERPs from the scalp and observed a similar pattern
for upright and inverted faces (but see [38]). Kanwisher
et al. [27] reported that the brain area activated with
presentation of upright faces responded almost as well
with inverted faces. However, these brain imaging
studies did not use a task that required full identity
recognition as in Experiment 1 here.
The second, more challenging aspect of our data
concerns the extension of the paradoxical inversion
previously found for faces, to objects. It should be
clear that this novel ®nding undermines the con-
clusions drawn by Farah et al. about face modular-
ity. Our data might prompt an anti-modularist
position, at least to the extent that their argument
for a face module was based on the inversion eect.
But put in a broader context, a paradoxical inver-
sion eect for objects is not all that more unex-
pected than one for faces. It should not come as a
surprise that other visual objects besides faces can
also induce a con®gural processing style. Indeed,
con®guration seems to play an important role in
object recognition as well and a normal inversion
eect was obtained with the present object stimuli
in some testing conditions [12]. If processing of the
whole stimulus is also important for object recog-
nition, a dominance of the con®guration over fea-
ture-based recognition can also occur in some cases
of brain damage like LH. Moreover, it is important
to emphasize that studies of patients with brain
damage can reveal aspects of performance that are
not manifest in the behavior of normal subjects
unless parametrical studies and/or psychophysical
testing would be run, which is rarely the case. As
we noted previously [10] patients with a visual de®-
cit may show an exacerbated version of a proces-
sing pattern that exists in normal subjects but only
shows up in extreme testing conditions (for
example, very short exposure durations). In any
event, the ®nding of paradoxical inversion eect for
objects challenges the strong conclusions drawn
from the paradoxical inversion ®ndings for faces.
The existence of a hard-wired processor which is
part of the strong modularity notion of face speci-
®city is dicult to apply to the case of shoes and
houses. In contrast, we would like to explain our
data by pointing to the similarity in processing op-
erations between objects and faces (as suggested by
many studies showing that the inversion and the
context eect are to some extent found with the
two stimulus categories). We cannot in the context
of this single case report develop further a general
theory of object recognition nor even raise the
major themes of the extensive literature in this ®eld.
It should be clear though from the methodology we
adopted that it is our belief that face and object
recognition raise very similar problems. Our data
substantiate a consistent theme in prosopagnosia
research which is that loss of face recognition goes
hand in hand with a subtle loss of object recog-
nition ability [6]. Our conclusion that patient LH
appears equally impaired on an object and face
inversion task is based on two experiments in which
object and face stimuli and tasks were equated. Our
conclusions should not be overstated though. In our
task exemplar level recognition was required for
faces as well as for objects and the patient was
impaired in dealing with both stimulus categories.
One might thus want to conclude from this result
that at the level of exemplar recognition this proso-
pagnosic patient does not show a category speci®c
impairment and that therefore face and object rec-
ognition can not be pulled apart. It is unlikely that
with the negative evidence for face speci®ty
obtained in exemplar matching the last frontier in
the battle against face modularity has been won.
Ultimately the speci®city of faces might have a
dierent origin than the one is captured by higher
order cognitive abilities of the kind at stake in
exemplar level recognition.
Another important issue is the convergence
between the patient's anomalous results on the inver-
sion task and those on the object context task. Both
results point to the importance of canonical orien-
tation. But the context eect provides more speci®c
information as it speci®es that the patient processes
the whole stimulus rather than just encoding on a
feature basis. This ®nding oers an interesting con-
trast and complement with the study by Davido
and Landis [9]. Their prosopagnosic patients had
lost con®gural processing for faces but they had also
lost that for objects. In other words, the patients
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studied by Davido and Landis could only attend to
features and as a consequence one would not expect
them to show either inversion or context eects. In
line with previous neuropsychological studies [31] we
have suggested a close link between con®guration-
based processing and intact structural encoding of
the stimulus. In other words, those aspects of the
object or face recognition process that are respon-
sible for coding the overall con®guration and for
making the link with stored object representations
appear to be intact in these patients. One expla-
nation of this similarity could be that face and
object processing systems share processing resources
at least up to the stage of encoding orientation and
overall con®guration. Separate routes for the two
stimulus classes would only be required to explain
recognition of personal identity in the case of faces.
This explanation is consistent with the notion that
matching of unfamiliar faces and familiar face recog-
nition are separable abilities [15]. But given the
results of Experiment 1 which did focus on matching
of the speci®c instances of unfamiliar faces the com-
mon processing resources would also have to include
mechanisms for coding token identity similarly for
faces and objects.
The present results challenges a taxonomy of visual
perception abilities based on a contrast between whole-
based and parts-based processing routes that corre-
spond respectively to faces and objects [2,18] and that
loss of the face speci®c system results in loss of con®g-
ural processing but leaves intact the feature-based
route [29]. This idea of two processing routes was
exempli®ed again recently in a study of patient CK
suering from visual object agnosia without prosopag-
nosia [34]. This study investigated a situation that is
the mirror image of the present one and asked whether
it was indeed the case that impaired object recognition
was not re¯ected in at least some aspects of face recog-
nition. As an explanation for the important ®nding
that CK has great diculty telling apart inverted
faces, the authors argue that the latter is due to the
impairment of feature-based processing route proper
to object recognition. But now our result suggests that
con®guration plays a role in object recognition just as
well. This challenges the accepted view, whereby the
face system is identi®ed with con®guration-based pro-
cesses and the object recognition system with feature-
based processes. Moreover, it does not seem to be the
case, as is implied by the accepted view, that loss of
the special face recognition system leaves intact an
autonomous system for feature-based recognition [34]
which would then kick in when the whole-based oper-
ations tailored for face processing are impaired or, vice
versa a whole-based system which would come to the
rescue of a feature-based object recognition system
when this is impaired.
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